Durable–Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper solves for the profit maximising strategy of a durable–goods monopolist when incoming demand varies over time. Each period, additional consumers enter the market; these consumers can then choose whether and when to purchase. We first characterise the consumer’s utility maximisation problem and, under a monotonicity condition, show the profit maximising allocation can be solved through a myopic algorithm, which has an intuitive marginal revenue interpretation. Consumers’ ability to delay creates an asymmetry in the optimal price path, which exhibits fast increases and slow declines. This asymmetry pushes the price level above that charged by a firm facing the average level of demand. Applications of this framework include deterministic demand cycles, one–off shocks and IID demand draws. The optimal policy outperforms renting and can be implemented by a time consistent best–price provision.
منابع مشابه
Entry Deterrence and Innovation in Durable-Goods Monopoly∗
This paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investment in durable goods monopoly under a threat of entry. It is well known that the durability causes time inconsistency to the durable goods monopolist, which in turn provides a competitive pressure. When entry threat exists, the durability of the product endows the monopolist with the power to deter entry since the current sales alter t...
متن کاملDurable Goods Monopoly with Network Externalities with Application to the PC Operating Systems Market
We analyze a model of multi-period monopoly in durable goods. Taking into consideration the special conditions of software markets, we assume that there are no used software markets and that manufacturers stop selling older software when they introduce a replacement model. We show that nominal as well as discounted (real) prices decrease over time but are above cost, thereby violating the Coase...
متن کاملEquilibrium in a durable goods market with lumpy adjustment
Durable goods are an important component of the business cycle. Equilibrium models of durable goods markets are made difficult by the lumpy nature of individual purchases. We show that a straight forward approximation of the distribution of durable goods holdings gives rise to a tractable equilibrium model. We analyze the case of competition as well as that of a monopoly producer. J.E.L. Classi...
متن کاملDurable Goods, Coasian Dynamics, and Uncertainty: Theory and Experiments
This paper presents a model in which a durable goods monopolist sells a product to two buyers. Each buyer is privately informed about his own valuation. Thus all players are imperfectly informed about market demand. We study the monopolist’s pricing behavior as players’ uncertainty regarding demand vanishes in the limit. In the limit, players are perfectly informed about the downward-sloping de...
متن کاملBargaining with Interdependent Values, Experience Effects and the Coase Conjecture
We study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and interdependent values. We show that as the gap between the cost and value of the weakest type shrinks to zero, the continuous time limit of equilibria changes dramatically from rare bursts of trade with long periods of inactivity to a smooth screening down the demand function, independent of the distribution. If we interpret the model ...
متن کامل