1000 words, Due Feb 15

The most distinctive feature of this clearly written and engaging book is that throughout its ten chapters, the author simultaneously develops two independent projects. The first project, as the title suggests, is to introduce the novice to some of the traditional issues in the philosophy of mind. To this end, the book is structured around discussions of dualism, physicalism, the problem of other minds, mental causation, personal identity, free will etc. But the book is not just an impersonal survey; the author's second project is to develop his own Wittgensteinian views about the proper methods and subjects of philosophical inquiry. The two projects are interwoven so closely that newcomers to philosophy will probably not detect where Cockburn is describing the major positions in the various areas, and where he is defending his personal viewpoint. Cockburn presents traditional philosophy of mind as being composed of two camps: Cartesian dualists and physicalists. Although we typically consider these camps to be strongly opposed, Cockburn argues that what they have in common is far more important. They both agree that 'the " mind " … is something distinct from the bodily being that (brain surgeons aside!) others see or touch' (143). This common assumption has skewed studies in the philosophy of mind. Instead Cockburn urges us to focus on the 'human being', which is 'that which moves the furniture, comforts my friends, and so on' (143). While Cartesians and physicalists become embroiled in problems concerning the exact nature of the relation of the mind to the external world, the human being approach suggests that we begin theorizing by taking the topic to be the total human being, who is part of 'the social world in which people judge that each other understand something, are in pain, are angry, or are in love' (41). Given this starting point, Cockburn suggests that most of the traditional issues of philosophy of mind disappear. The reader – novice or trained philosopher – is sure to wonder exactly how Cockburn's view opposes the two traditional camps. Cockburn's answer is the Wittgensteinian (and Humean) claim that 'all justifications must end somewhere' (101). True enough; but the kind of justification one is looking for often depends on the nature of one's project. For example,