Gilbert T . Null and Roger A . Simons Manifolds , Concepts and Moment Abstracta

ion gets to work on a basis of primary intuitions, and with it a new categorial act-character emerges, in which a new style of objectivity becomes apparant, an objectivity which can only become apparent whether given as 'real' or as 'merely imagined' in just such a founded act. Naturally I do not here mean abstraction merely in the sense of setting-in-relief of some dependent moment in a sensible object, but ideational abstraction, where no such dependent moment, but its Idea, its Universal, is brought to consciousness, and achieves actual givenness. We must presuppose such an act in order that the very sort, to which the manifold single moments 'of one and the same sort' stand opposed, may itself come before us, and may come before us as one and the same (Husserl, LU VI, § 52). The intuitive concepts of whole and part are paradigm cases of the type of concept which, following Husser!, we can characterise as vague or