Overview of Bergemann-Morris papers on Robust Mechanism Design
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چکیده
Since 1999, Dirk Bergemann and I have written a series of papers on "Robust Mechanism Design": 1. "Robust Mechanism Design." (Bergemann and Morris (2005)) 2. "Ex Post Implementation." (Bergemann and Morris (2008a)) 3. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms." (Bergemann and Morris (2009a)) 4. "An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values." (Bergemann and Morris (2007)) 5. "The Role of the Common Prior Assumption in Robust Implementation." (Bergemann and Morris (2008c)) 6. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms." (Bergemann and Morris (2008b)) 7. "Robust Virtual Implementation." (Bergemann and Morris (2009b))
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