Simulating Auxiliary Inputs, Revisited

For any pair (X,Z) of correlated random variables we can think of Z as a randomized function of X. Provided that Z is short, one can make this function computationally efficient by allowing it to be only approximately correct. In folklore this problem is known as simulating auxiliary inputs. This idea of simulating auxiliary information turns out to be a powerful tool in computer science, finding applications in complexity theory, cryptography, pseudorandomness and zero-knowledge. In this paper we revisit this problem, achieving the following results: (a) We discuss and compare efficiency of known results, finding the flaw in the best known bound claimed in the TCC’14 paper ”How to Fake Auxiliary Inputs”. (b) We present a novel boosting algorithm for constructing the simulator. Our technique essentially fixes the flaw. This boosting proof is of independent interest, as it shows how to handle ”negative mass” issues when constructing probability measures in descent algorithms. (c) Our bounds are much better than bounds known so far. To make the simulator (s, ǫ)-indistinguishable we need the complexityO ( s · 2ǫ ) in time/circuit size, which is better by a factor ǫ compared to previous bounds. In particular, with our technique we (finally) get meaningful provable security for the EUROCRYPT’09 leakage-resilient stream cipher instantiated with a standard 256-bit block cipher, like AES256. Our boosting technique utilizes a two-step approach. In the first step we shift the current result (as in gradient or sub-gradient descent algorithms) and in the separate step we fix the biggest non-negative mass constraint violation (if applicable).