A Study of Sports Crowd Behavior: The Case of the Great Pumpkin Incident

Disagreement on which theory of collective behavior best predicts or explains how crowd processes work prompted this case study. By closely examining, through participant observation, the unfolding of one episode of nonviolent collective behavior at a professional football game, four frequently applied theories of collective behavior are tested for their utility in sports crowd situations. Each theory is assessed for strengths and weaknesses. "Findings show contagion theory, convergence theory, emergent norm theory, and value-added theory all valuable in explaining some facets of observed spectator behavior; therefore a synthesis of theories might prove more useful than applying theories separately. A methodological problem emerged during evaluation, concerning difficulty in distinguishing among the indicators for each theory. Several overlapping theoretical concepts confounded attempts to operationalize unique empirical measures and hence, to compare the theories satisfactorily. Further research is needed to provide adequate measures. Controversy exists among social scientists about which theory of collective behavior, if any, proves most applicable to sports crowd situations. Researchers debate the utility of different theories as concern centers around how and why collective processes sometime operate to escalate spectator behavior beyond conventional limits. This paper tests four of the most frequently applied theories of collective behavior on an observed nonviolent collective spectator incident. The purpose is to learn more about sports crowd dynamics and to shed light on which perspective(s) might best predict and explain collective behavior in the sports context. THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR The foundations of crowd theory were laid at the end of the nineteenth century in Europe by Gustave LeBon who first called attention to the crowd as a social ohenomen. Livine: in a time of 70 Sports Crowd Behavior revolutionary upheaval, LeBon took a pathological view, in that under given circumstances he found crowd behavior not only different from but intellectually inferior to individual behavior. LeBon asserted that rather than interpreting phenomena rationally, individuals in crowd situations become dominated by their unconscious personalities. Suggestion, imitation, and contagion result in the infectious spread of emotion, whereby crowd members fall under the influence of a collective mind. Individuals have shed responsibility for their actions in the sea of anonymity (LeBon, 1895). This conceptualization formed a framework for what would later be called contagion theory. In the mid-twentieth century Herbert Blumer refined contagion theory by introducing the notion of a circular reaction, adapting the earlier ideas of Floyd Allport (Brown and Goldin, 1973). During a circular reaction, responses of individuals within a crowd reproduce the responses of others around them, reflecting stimulation back and forth and thereby causing its intensification. Circular reactions signal the existence of a state of social unrest, which according to Blumer (1951), is the initial process of elementary collective behavior. During social unrest people may become engaged by the occurrence of some exciting event, and successively caught up in milling, collective excitement, and finally in social contagion as arousal intensifies. Individuals become sensitized to one another, experiencing rapport which induces the lowering of social resistance and a loss of normal individual control. Blumer maintains that at this point, infected individuals are most likely to engage in impulsive, non-rational behavior (Blumer, 195 1). Contagion theory met wide criticism due to later empirical findings. LeBon's notion of a group mind was rejected by most subsequent scholars, as was the concept of irrationality. Some social scientists also questioned uniformity of behavior, the process of spontaneous social contagion, and how to account for collective behavior's termination (Turner, 1964; Smelser, 1963; Berk, 1974). A less popular conception of collective behavior, convergence theory, stems from early psychological theories of Sigmund Freud and Floyd Allport, and was further developed by Neal Miller and John Dollard. Convergence theory maintains that crowd behavior develops because individuals with shared predispositons have converged at the same location (Turner,1964). Social facilitation then ensues when all respond in a similar manner toward a common stimulus (Wright, 1978). Although convergence theory added a new dimension, it received criticism for lacking a structural framework and not explaining certain crowd dynamics such as behavioral shifts, multiple predispositions, or role acauisition (Turner. 1964: Berk. 1974) J S S I , Levy 71 Later theorists, Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, drew from insight scattered throughout the literature upon which they built a new theory of collective behavior (Wright, 1978). Turner and Killian (1957) theorized that instead of crowd behavior being normless, individual crowd members were simply following new norms rather than traditional ones. It was the mood and imagery particular to an immediate situation which caused these new norms to emerge that were then transmitted to others through social interaction. When a unique circumstance arises, people lack guidelines for defining appropriate action to follow; therefore, they look to see what others are doing and model their own behavior accordingly. In this way, individuals communicate the shared definition, pressuring others around them to conform (Turner and Killian, 1957). Emergent norm theory received praise for contributing insight about normative implications and for its view of collective behavior as interactionally produced (Brovfn and Goldin, 1973; Wright, 1978). However, Brown and Goldin (1973) characterized emergent norm theory as incomplete and lacking in scope, while Wright (1978) argued that not enough attention was given to nonverbal processes by Turner and Killian. Recognizing the shortcomings inherent in each of the preceding theories, Neil Smelser (1963) constructed value-added theory to improve analysis by logically patterning determinants of collective behavior from least to most specific. The focus narrows as a new value is added at each stage, redefining social action and ultimately producing only one possible outcome. The first stage is structural conduciveness: social conditions must favor collective action. Second is structural strain: failure of some aspect of the social system to function effectively, with several sources of strain often occurring in combination. Third is the growth and spread of a shared generalized belief: a belief which identifies and attributes characteristics to the source(s) of strain and then determines an appropriate response. Fourth are precipitating factors: factors which confirm and give substance to the belief as well as intensifying the previous determinants. The fifth stage is mobilizing the collectivity for action: leaders emerge as a division of labor takes place, and the type of collective behavior is determined. The sixth stage, social control overarches all: either preventive or interventive measures taken by agencies of social control may interfere with the foregoing determinants at any stage. Smelser applied the preceding stages to several forms of collective behavior. His "hostile outburst" category, to be tested here, is described as "action mobilized on the basis of a generalized belief assigning responsibility for an r * n A a n ; v o h l a rr+o+n -F n F L ; c tn 0n-n n n n m t " I l n L q n 72 Sports Crowd Behavior JSSI, Levy 73 Criticism of Smelser's theory is mixed. Evans (1969) lauded its significance as did Marx (1972) who approved of valueadded theory's conventional rather than abnormal behavioral categories. Brown and Goldin (1973) pointed to Smelser's importance in demonstrating collective behavior's multiple determinants and for his emphasis on shifts in crowd organization over time. Difficulties however, arose over empirically testing the principles of value-added theory. Quarantelli and Hundley's (1969) research findings showed only limited support for Smelser's theory. Cume and Skolnick (1972) challenged the theory's defining characteristics as ambiguous and simplistic, deeming Smelser's own use of supportive evidence often prejudgemental and biased. Furthermore, Turner (1964) claimed that when applying valueadded theory the researcher loses richness of data, since conclusions can only be drawn about the success or lack of success in reaching one of the final collective behavior forms. To summarize, each of the above theories views crowd behavior from a different point of departure. Contagion theory looks at psychological aspects of irrationality and impulsiveness, describing how individuals immersed in a crowd become infected by a mob mentality. Convergence theory emphasizes how like-minded individuals converging to a crowd situation tend to respond to stimuli in a similar manner. Emergent norm theory focuses on how social interaction creates new ways of behaving in unusual circumstances. Value-added theory analyzes those determinants which limit the possible consequences of a crowd situation. Each seems to address only particular elements of crowd behavior. Several scholars agree that explanations remain incomplete (Evans, 1969; Cunie and Skolnick, 1972; Berk,1974). THEORETICAL APPLICATIONS TO SPORTS CROWDS Applying the preceding theories and others to spectator crowd behavior, sports scholars found differential utility among models. Hocking (1 982), when viewing conventional spectator behavior rather than deviant behavior, reached some impressionistic conclusions. He saw value in each theory he examined. In describing an exciting basketball game, Hocking found convergent theory significant in explaining parallel behaviors within a highly partisan crowd, contagion theory best in accounting for the spread of responsive booing to an ambiguous officiating decision, and emergent norm theory important in revealing why spectators rose for the national anthem. Mann (1979, 1989) also took an eclectic approach. He attributed uninhibited, impulsive, antisocial behavior stemming from the extreme emotional arousal of either a victory or loss at game's end to contagion. Hooliganism, aggression and violence perpetrated by associated young British males attending soccer contests, is consistent with the convergence model. Regulated, normative behavior among spectators assembled in ticket lines supports an emergent norm perspective. Distorted perceptions of a game by losing fans can lead to shared, generalized beliefs, held a necessary determinant for hostile outbursts according value-added theory.' Kutcher (1983), however, discarded contagion theory as outdated, and depicted emergent norm theory as that most applicable to sports crowd behavior. Likening sports events to carnivals, Kutcher concluded that many sports events produce unique circumstances for spectators. Conventional roles and norms become relaxed, allowing deviant behavior to emerge that would be negatively sanctioned elsewhere. White (1975), on the other hand, found value-added theory useful in explaining spectator riots, as did Smith (1975), who demonstrated violence to be the primary precipitating factor in collective episodes at sporting events. In contrast, Lewis' (1982) case-history studies showed little evidence of the structural strains, central to Smelser's theory, associated with fan violence. Guttman also described value-added theory as disappointing when applied to "dozens of episodes" of spectator collective behavior (1986, p. 167). He further argued that no single theory adequately explains sports-crowd violence, but found some utility in the emergent norm model. The present approach reinvestigates the strengths and weaknesses of all mentioned theories by applying each to a single sports crowd incident. Are any useful? How do they contribute to our understanding of crowd behavior? What are their shortcomings when empirical application is attempted? Is anything left unexplained? Systematic analysis of a closely observed sports crowd episode may supply insight not only about how collective behavior theories fare in explaining this particular incident, but also about their utility in predicting or explaining sports crowd behavior in general.