A dynamic auction for multi - object procurement under a hard budget constraint *
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer’s objective function. JEL D21, D44, D45, D82.
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