Iterative Dominance and Sequential Bargaining
نویسنده
چکیده
A new game theoretic analysis of finite horizon, complete information bargaining is advanced. The extensive form reflects an attempt to model unstructured negotiations, in which the negotiants can gain no artificial advantage from the details of the bargaining protocol. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies selects a unique outcome. These conditions serve to preclude embedded static bargaining problems of the sort that have historically been deemed indeterminate, thereby ensuring that the dynamic problems analyzed will be resolvable without imposing any particular static theory. JEL classification codes: C78, D71, D74.
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