A Selling Mechanism*

نویسندگان

  • David Pérez-Castrillo
  • Marilda Sotomayor
چکیده

For the assignment game, we propose the following selling mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first; then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any. The first phase of the game determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. We prove that the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in the strong sense of the mechanism coincides with the set of sellers’ optimal stable outcomes when buyers use maximal strategies.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Modeling of Capacity Reservation and Supplier Selection Based on Option Contract

    Capacity Reservation,   Option Contract,   Supplier Selection A key issue for manufacturing firms is planning for outsourced components. In this research, we have considered a manufacturer in a Make-to-Order production environment who has to outsource a special component from a set of suppliers. One selling season is considered and the manufacturer faces uncertain demand during the selling ...

متن کامل

A Comparative Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms

Auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. Single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. Double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. Nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auctio...

متن کامل

Selling with Evidence

We consider a seller who can propose any selling mechanism to a buyer. The seller’s reservation value and the buyer’s valuation can depend both on the buyer’s privatelyknown taste and on product characteristics privately-known to the seller. Product information is voluntarily and costlessly certifiable by the seller. We characterize all feasible allocations under any certifiability structure an...

متن کامل

A two-level discount model for coordinating a decentralized supply chain considering stochastic price-sensitive demand

In this paper, a discount model is proposed to coordinate pricing and ordering decisions in a two-echelon supply chain (SC). Demand is stochastic and price sensitive while lead times are fixed. Decentralized decision making where downstream decides on selling price and order size is investigated. Then, joint pricing and ordering decisions are extracted where both members act as a single entity ...

متن کامل

Simulating the Demand Reshaping and Substitution Effects of Probabilistic Selling

This paper addresses the effect of probabilistic selling on inventory decisions and the expected profit through demand reshaping and demand substitution. By considering a scenario with two higher-priced specific products and one lower-priced probabilistic product, we construct a new newsboy-type inventory model with demand reshaping and substitution. A simulation study is implemented to explore...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2003