Russia and the new authoRitaRians

Russia has adopted a neo-authoritarian media system that has more in common with similar non-democratic systems around the world than with the Soviet system that once prevailed on the same territory. Though the picture for media freedom in Russia is bleak today, the types of control imposed are significantly different from the Soviet era in terms of breadth, depth, and mechanisms of control, and the role of ideology. Fearing the kind of revolutions that took place in Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia, Russian President Vladimir Putin is imposing tight restrictions, setting an example for authoritarian regimes around the world. M than twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and twenty-five years after Soviet Communist General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev unleashed the heretofore moribund Soviet press with the policy of glasnost, the landscape of media in the post-Soviet space has changed. And for the worse. After the liberalization of the late 1980s and relative freedom amidst the chaos of the 1990s, the press has taken a big step backwards in the Putin era, and not just in Russia. In the 2013 Freedom House rankings, nine of the fifteen post-Soviet countries were rated “not free,” with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine listed as “partly free,” and only the three Baltic states, now European Union and NATO members, free.1 Russia has ignominiously made the Committee to Protect Journalists’ Impunity Index’s top ten list for countries “where journalists are slain and the killers go free.”2 Reporters without Borders expresses a 1 Freedom House. 2013. “Freedom of the Press 2013: Global Press Freedom Rankings,” At http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Global%20and%20regional%20tables.pdf, accessed November 9, 2013. 2 Committee to Protect Journalists. 2013. “Getting Away with Murder.” 2013 Impunity Index, At http://www.cpj.org/reports/2013/05/impunity-index-getting-away-with-murder.php, accessed November 9, 2013. Jonathan Becker is Vice President and Dean for International Affairs and Civic Engagement at Bard College, PO Box 5000, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000, USA, email: [email protected]. 192 Demokratizatsiya similar view, with their map of the former Soviet space (with the exception of the Baltics and Kyrgyz Republic) swathed in red and black, their lowest categories of press freedom. They also name Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Belarus’ Alexandr Lukashenka as leading “enemies of press freedom.”3 That things have not gone well for the media in most of the former Soviet states is undeniable. But it does not necessarily follow that the current challenges are the same as those during the Soviet period. The primary purpose of this paper is to answer the following question: Is there something uniquely post-“Soviet” in media systems in Russia and many of the countries which emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union? In other words, in using the word “Soviet,” whether the modifier is “neo” or “post,” are we speaking of a geographic space or specific and unique legacies of the Soviet era that continue to shape and impact the media in those countries? I will argue that the media landscape, particularly in the critical sphere of government control, has more in common with other authoritarian countries than it does with the immediate Soviet past. In this context, the media systems are better described as “neo-authoritarian’’ than “post-” or “neo-” “Soviet.”4 This distinction is important for two reasons. From a politics perspective, it helps to clarify analytically that what is taking place in the post-Soviet space is very different from Soviet times: authoritarianism may be on the rise after the failure of the democratic hopes of the 1990s and the colored revolutions of the 2000s, but we are by no means witnessing the rebirth of the Soviet Union. Second, from a media studies perspective, it moves forward the analysis of differences between various forms of non-democratic media systems, a subject which media scholars often lament as understudied.5 In order to answer the primary question, a number of related questions will be addressed: What is a neo-authoritarian press and how does it differ from the post-totalitarian press that typified the Soviet Union? How is the current Russian press similar to and different from the Soviet press? How is it similar to and different from media in authoritarian counties outside of the former Soviet space and what does that mean for the relationship between the current press and Soviet legacies? Finally, what are the implications of similarities and differences of current media vis-à-vis 3 Reporters without Borders. 2013. “Press Freedom Index 2013,” http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html, accessed November 9, 2013. 4 See Sarah Oates. 2007. “The Neo-Soviet Model of the Media,” Europe-Asia Studies, 39:8 (December) or Clifford May. September 19, 2013. “Vladimir Putin, the Neo Soviet Man,” At http://www.nationalreview.com/article/358894/vladimir-putin-neo-soviet-man-clifford-dmay, accessed December 11, 2013. 5 Kaarle Nordenstreng. 1999.“Normative Theories of the Media: Lessons from Russia.” In eds. Yassen N. Zassoursky and Elena Vartanova, Media, Communications and the Open Society. (Moscow: IKAR), p. 150. See also Oates, “The Neo-Soviet Model.” Russia and the New Authoritarians 193 Soviet times and other authoritarian media (historically and not) and what do these mean for countries’ future? The paper will first and foremost concentrate on Russia because of its size and influence on its Eurasian neighbors, but other post-Soviet states will be brought into the discussion to illustrate some of the key points. Soviet (Post-Totalitarian) vs. Neo-Authoritarian Media Systems In order to understand where the media in Russia and many of the states of the former Soviet Union stand today, we need to step back to look at the conceptual distinctions between the Soviet (or what I have previously termed “post-totalitarian”) press system6 and neo-authoritarian media systems. Differences emerge in terms of the perceived role of the press, access, the relative autonomy of the press vs. the center of power, and the interaction between censorship and ideology. The role of the press in the Soviet Union was utilitarian: it was a form of ideological education, the party’s main tool to shape public opinion. Indeed, the Soviet approach to the press emerged in part because of the modern belief in the indoctrinating and transformative power of mass communications. Access to the entire press in the Soviet Union was controlled by the Communist Party. The party/state owned all print and broadcast facilities and exerted both positive and negative control through an elaborate system of management that included guiding the education of journalists, power over the appointment of media personnel, and the imposition of a complex system of pre-and post-publication censorship.7 The press enjoyed no relative autonomy vis-à-vis the party/state.8 Journalists operated as extensions of the party apparatus, behaving no differently than others who worked in the sphere of ideological education. In this context the nature of the ideology was critically important: because the Soviet ideology, Marxism-Leninism, was supposedly based on scientifically determined truths that explain history and the nature of human order, the Soviet press was the object of ideological censorship that meant that journalists were not only restricted in what they could say, but in the language they could use. Journalists were bound by a special discourse that suffused all public communication and words became so loaded with evaluative connotations that it was difficult for them to express ideas beyond the accepted, official beliefs.9 As Young put it, “for every politically significant 6 Jonathan Becker. 2002. Soviet and Russian Press Coverage of the United States: Press, Politics and Identity in Transition. London: Palgrave. 7 For a complete discussion of totalitarian media systems, see Becker, Soviet and Russian Press, pp. 1-45. 8 Robert A. Dahl. 1982. Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 26. 9 Jeffery C. Gordfarb. 1991. Beyond Glasnost: The Post-Totalitarian Mind. Chicago: Univer194 Demokratizatsiya word, one meaning; for every historical event, one interpretation; for every social problem, one solution...”10 The citizen, in the words of one Soviet journalist paraphrasing Lenin, was treated as “an imbecile who doesn’t know what is good for him and therefore has to be agitated, propagandized and collectively organized.”11 It should be noted that there were always small amounts of manufactured diversity, small differences in press coverage encouraged by the party/state in order to appeal to audiences of different regions, educational levels and occupations.12 With the decline of ideological fervor in the late (pre-glasnost) Soviet period, there was even sanctioned diversity or what has been called “permitted dissent,”13 which suggests the appearance of non-uniform press content that, although not explicitly endorsed by the leadership, is tolerated by it. However, in the Soviet case the relaxation of controls was both narrow and selective. Sanctioned diversity was most likely to be found in publications with extremely limited, elite audiences, such as cultural and literary journals, or in specialty academic journals.14 The press remained identified with and subordinated to the party, which retained and regularly exercised strict positive and negative control over the entire press. Finally, even as the ideology lost its vibrancy, strict ideological control continued, binding society in a common language and in so doing limiting any potential opposition to the regime. Neo-authoritarian media systems, on the other hand, are an essential element of the tactical choice that many modern authoritarian leaders make: to allow some elements of openness and contestation in exchange for greater legitimacy both domestically and internationally. As Krastev argues, these leaders recognize the “status of democracy and elections as the only acceptable sources of legitimacy in the modern world,” and “the increasing costs of violence as an instrument for preserving political power.”15 They therefore choose to allow simulated forms of democratic governance, including elections, but ensure that in doing so they create sity of Chicago Press, p. 55. 10 John Wesley Young. 1991. Totalitarian Language. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, p. 31. 11 Alexander Pumpyansky. 1990. “Are We Really So Tired of the Truth?,” New Times, no. 14, pp. 8-14 12 Juan Linz. 1975. “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes.” In eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, Macropolitical Theory. Reading: Addison Wesley Publishing, p. 191. 13 Dina R. Spechler. 1982. Permitted Dissent in the USSR. New York: Praeger. 14 Goldfarb, Beyond Glasnost, p. 57; Becker, Soviet and Russian Press, p. 25. 15 According to Krastev, “Democracy’s doubles can best be understood as an attempt to construct political regimes that mimic democratic institutions but work outside the logic of political representation and seek to repress any trace of genuine political pluralism.” Ivan Krastev. 2006. “Democracy’s ‘Doubles’,” Journal of Democracy, 17:2 (April), p. 54. Russia and the New Authoritarians 195 “conditions of radical unfairness” in the competition for political power.16 For these new autocrats who seek “to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty,”17 the mass media is perhaps the most important tool in limiting meaningful pluralism and undermining the capacity of citizens to make informed choices.18 Neo-authoritarian leaders recognize that in today’s world of relatively low-cost international travel, cell phones, instant messaging, the internet, and satellite television, they cannot, without great cost, seal their citizens off from alternative messages, as did totalitarian and authoritarian leaders of old. With an increasing emphasis on participation in the world economy, and the technological openness that that entails, and an emerging, sophisticated and mobile middle-class, the hermetic seal of the past has too many negative social and economic consequences. They therefore assert a rhetorical commitment to a free press, eschewing totalitarian and post-totalitarian claims that the role of the press is to support stateor party-determined ideological priorities. While such claims of press freedom are grossly overstated, the breadth and depth of control are both different and less robust than in the Soviet system described above. The mechanisms for controlling media, like other important institutions, are often more subtle than in Soviet or traditional authoritarian systems. The center of power asserts control over the most popular forms of communication, usually television, while allowing relative autonomy in media that have a more limited reach and impact. The state asserts control in a variety of ways. It institutes rules on government ownership and erodes barriers that are meant to ensure the autonomy of public broadcast outlets. It co-opts private media through mutually beneficial relations with owners, who often have a symbiotic relationship with the political leadership. The political center may direct subsidies and advertising revenue to sympathetic media organs.19 If owners of opposition media resist the blandishments of the center of political power they are likely to face various forms of intimidation. They might find themselves the subjects of quasi-legal processes involving issues like registration and license requirements. They may also find themselves the focus of the selective enforcement of tax codes. Imprisonment and exile are not unheard of. The stage is set for 16 Andreas Schedler. 2002. “The Menu of Manipulation,” Journal of Democracy, 13:2, (April), p. 43. See also Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 2002. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, 13:2, (April), p. 53. 17 Schedler, “Menu of Manipulation,” p. 36. 18 From this perspective, neo-authoritarian systems differ from more traditional ones because in the current environment the control over television and other forms of mass communication is not the product of technological necessity, as it was in the early days of the airwaves, but of a conscious political choice. 19 Jonathan Becker. 2004. “Lessons from Russia: A Neo-Authoritarian System,” European Journal of Communication, 19:2, (June), pp. 139-163. 196 Demokratizatsiya disloyal owners to surrender control over high impact media to private entities with close links to the state. It is also often the case that in countries with neo-authoritarian systems, foreign ownership, which might be more insulated from pressures, is limited and discouraged. Alternative forms of communication, including satellite television and the internet, often face hurdles – financial, technological, linguistic, or legal – that limit their impact and allow the media controlled by the new autocrats to continue to dominate. Message shaping in neo-authoritarian systems is neither as extensive nor intensive as in post-totalitarian systems, because there is no all-encompassing ideology. The media landscape as a whole is influenced by market forces, and thus focused often on least common denominator popular programming rather than ideological education. While tight reins may be placed on current events topics, and on television in particular, they are not as ubiquitous, and there may exist windows of pluralism, and even privately owned stations, which, although often with limited reach, may offer criticism of leaders and their policies. There might exist vibrant print media, or at least publications, that are independently owned (by individuals, parties, or foreign corporations), relatively autonomous, accessible to the population, and highly critical of the regime, in spite of periodic harassment, violence and closures. The same is the case for radio. As far as content is concerned, the closer any issue may rest to the heart of the political leadership, the greater the assertion of control. For example, during elections, large audience media are regularly mobilized to improve the position of the center of political power and its selected candidates. The party of power gets the vast majority of (usually adulatory) coverage, while the opposition faces some combination of “information blockade” and merciless attacks, often from prominent journalists who in the former Soviet space have earned the sobriquet “information killers,” for their brutal attacks on opposition politicians.20 Similarly aggressive message control may extend over such critical issues as internal unrest, corruption, and governmental responses to manmade and natural disasters. The mass media may still contain sharp criticism on such issues. However, critical voices would normally appear in media with limited effective public reach and/or drowned out in a sea of regime-sympathetic messages. Journalists in neo-authoritarian systems also face a litany of hurdles that limit their capacity to criticize the center of power. They are often told in formal and informal ways by politicians and activist owners where the limits are, and they may be dismissed if they cross the line of acceptable dissent. They are often confronted with an array of laws related to professional licensing, access to information, and state secrets that impede 20 Marta Dyczok. 2005. “Breaking Through the Information Blockade: Election and Revolution in Ukraine 2004,” Canadian Slavonic Papers, 47 (September-December), p. 242. Russia and the New Authoritarians 197 their freedom of action. They are also increasingly the victims of civil and criminal defamation and libel laws, including laws barring insults to state leaders, which effectively preclude criticism of political decisions.21 Foreign journalists, who often pave the way for satellite and/or internet coverage, often face challenging visa regimes. Finally, they are the objects of physical attacks, imprisonment, and even murder. Journalists are always cognizant that there may be an exorbitant cost for criticism, either personal or financial, thus promoting self-censorship, the most ubiquitous limit on freedom of expression worldwide. The neo-authoritarian approach has found resonance across the globe. Whether it is in Yemen,22 Ethiopia,23 Singapore,24 or Venezuela,25 leaders pay homage to the importance of freedom of expression and attempt to bask in the glow of democratic legitimacy while at the same time supporting an environment that fundamentally undermines political competition. Today’s Russian press fits in well with the neo-authoritarian approach. Indeed, as Leon Willems and Arch Puddington have argued, “Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has emerged as a laboratory for the development of methods to suppress media freedom in the post-totalitarian era.”26 Russian vs. Soviet Media The Russian press has experienced tremendous backsliding since the halcyon days of glasnost and the early days of the 1990s. Typical of neo-authoritarian leaders, Putin professes support for a free press, calling media freedom “one of the cornerstones of democracy” and asserting that “if we don’t have a free mass media, we shall very soon slide back into the past.”27 However, his actions are not consistent with these priorities. There 21 Marina Ottaway. 2003. Democracy Challenged, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 52-155; Article XIX, 2000. “Defining Defamation,” At http://www. article19.org/pdfs/standards/definingdefamation.pdf, accessed November 21, 2013. 22 Joel Campagna. 2006. “Attacks, censorship, and dirty tricks: In Yemen, the press climate is deteriorating,” Committee to Protect Journalists, At http://www.cpj.org/reports/2006/03/ yemen-press.php, accessed November 21, 2013). 23 Mohamed Ademo. 2012. “Media Restrictions Tighten in Ethiopia,” Columbia Journalism Review, At http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/ethiopia_news_crackdown.php?page=all, accessed, December 6, 2013. 24 Garry Rodan. 2003. “Embracing electron media but suppressing civil society: authoritarian consolidation in Singapore,” The Pacific Review, 16: 4, (2003), pp. 503-524. 25 Boris Munoz. 2013. “The Media and the Citizen in Venezuela,” New Yorker, August 30, 2013, At http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/currency/2013/08/venezuela-the-media-and-the-citizen.html, accessed December 11, 2013. 26 Leon Willems and Arch Puddington. 2013. “Russian Model Gains as Press Freedom Declines,” At http://www.freedomhouse.org/blog/russian-model-gains-press-freedom-declines, accessed November 27, 2013. 27 Communication Law in Transition: A Newsletter. November 1999 , 1:2, At http://pcmlp. socleg.ox.ac.uk/transition/, accessed November, 2007. 198 Demokratizatsiya are some important similarities to the Soviet era. The Russian government continues to dominate the media landscape. It owns or controls through sympathetic parties the vast majority of news media, including the most important form of communication, television. The media is viewed in instrumental terms: control is used to achieve the ends of the party of power, both in terms of promoting government leaders and policies and assailing enemies. There is limited pluralism and diversity: television is President-centric, especially when it is Vladimir Putin’s turn to be president, and opposition voices are severely constrained. Due to the political and economic environment, self-censorship remains a critical and ubiquitous problem, whether the media is publicly or privately owned. As Masha Gessen said, “Where the Soviet regime used direct censorship, with a specially assigned person at every media outlet clearing every story before publication, the instrument of control today is fear. Reporters, editors and media owners are constantly looking over their shoulder.”28 In spite of the bleak picture in Russia, it is still the case that things are substantially different from the Soviet period in terms of the breadth and depth of control of the media as well as methods of control, differences that reflect the neo-authoritarian approaches discussed above and witnessed increasingly across the globe. They occur in key areas such as diversity of content, the role of ideology, access to media, and the scope and methods of control. The Russian media are undoubtedly more diverse than throughout the vast majority of the Soviet period, particularly when they are not covering sensitive domestic concerns like Chechnya, or important international topics like Georgia or Syria. In terms of print media, while the major national daily newspapers and most major weeklies toe the president’s line, on the streets, at least in big cities, one can purchase newspapers covering a wide array of views. There are several hundred titles available, more than in Soviet times, although it should be noted that several of the most popular publications are tabloid in style and substance, and not well trusted.29 Alternative views are also heard over the radio waves via Ekho Moskvy, which has maintained its approach of presenting divergent and even critical voices, in spite of the fact that it is owned by the state energy giant Gazprom. However, its reach (and that of other alternative radio voices) remains limited, ranking as only the tenth most popular station in the country.30 Per the neo-authoritarian playbook, television remains 28 Masha Gessen. 2013. “As Russian Journalists, our lives are dark comedy and tragedy,” Globe and Mail, May 3, 2013. At http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/as-russian-journalists-our-lives-are-blackcomedy-and-dark-tragedy/article11687214/, accessed January, 2014. 29 Oates, “Neo-Soviet Model,” p, 1286. 30 Olga Khostumova. 2013. “A Complete Guide to Who Controls the Russian News Media,” Russia and the New Authoritarians 199 largely controlled by the Kremlin: the top five television stations by audience reach (Perviy Kanal, Rossiya 1, NTV, TNT and Pyatiy Kanal) are all controlled by the state or state enterprises.31 The leadership’s focus on television still appears to have merit: around 90 percent of the population prefers to get news from television and around 50 percent cite it as the most trusted form of communication.32 It should be noted that even on the president-centric television, news and current events programs occasionally have alternative voices, debates and disagreements, and the opposition can even make the occasional appearance. The cable and internet station Dozhd’ TV offered robust coverage of the post-2011 election protests and regularly presents opposition figures. As Dozhd’s editor-inchief Mikhail Zyagar said, “We’re not an opposition TV channel, we’re just a normal TV channel giving the floor to representatives of different movements and people with different points of view.”33 In this context, it is also important to note that the internet has grown rapidly in Russia in recent years, reaching between 50-60 percent of the population, up from around 10 percent a decade earlier, with the vast majority of that group, particularly those in large cities, being regular users. Broadband usage is also growing greatly.34 The internet has more diverse ownership and more voices, and social media is thriving. While there have been rumblings of efforts at greater control over internet service providers, the state has yet to show the inclination or the capacity to take a Chinese-style approach of control. The internet certainly played an important role in the protests that followed the parliamentary elections of 2011. One key issue that distinguishes the Russian from the Soviet press is that there is no highly developed ideology. Indeed, if anything, with new market pressures, the press has shifted from being highly politicized in Soviet times to largely de-politicized, with the media welcoming the same At http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/12/brief-history-russian-media/#sdfootnote2sym, accessed December 10, 2013. 31 Khostumova, “Who Controls Russian Media.” 32 The Moscow Times. 2013. “88% of Russians Prefer to Get News from TV,” At, http:// www.themoscowtimes.com/print/article/88-of-russians-prefer-to-get-news-from-tv/482864. html. accesed December 14, 2013. See also: Khostumova, “Who Controls Russian Media.” 33 Courtney Weaver. 2012. “Dozhd’ TV: A Breath of Fresh Air,” Financial Times, February 27, 2012, At http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/02/27/dozhd-tv-a-gust-of-fresh-air/#axzz2mgiM5pC4, accessed December 12, 2013. 34 “According to Public Opinion Fund data for autumn 2012, Russia has
a monthly internet audience of 61.2 million people over 18 years of age – which is more than 52% of the adult population. For the majority of users, the internet has become a regular part of everyday life. Three-quarters of users (almost 47 million people) are online daily. According to TNS data, in cities with a population of more than 100,000 people, practically all users (94%) have internet access at home –
and the majority have broadband.” Development of Media in Russia’s Regions. 2013. At http://download.yandex.ru/company/ya_russian_regions_report_2013.pdf, accessed, December 14, 2013. 200 Demokratizatsiya entertainment and tabloid dross that dominates entertainment systems around the world.35 To the extent that it is politicized, the Russian media is more sultanistic (in which, according to Linz and Stepan, there is “almost never political pluralism, because political power is so directly related to the ruler’s person ”)36 than totalitarian: while there may be a cult of leader, there is no guiding ideology, no claims to truths that are scientifically determined and which can transform human history.37 As a consequence of this, particularly combined with the diverse forms of ownership, there is nothing like the highly developed system of ideological control that existed during the Soviet period. There is no all-encompassing system of ideological education from cradle to grave, a less distinct “party line,” and no GLAVLIT censors conducting pre-publication censorship at all media outlets. As Owen Mathews explained, “The Kremlin’s approach to media control was and is essentially pragmatic rather than ideological—the rule of thumb is that newspapers such as Novaya Gazeta or radio stations like Radio Ekho Moskvy are allowed to be critical, as long as they are not too widely listened to or circulated.” 38 The neo-authoritarian approach is also manifested in methods of control. With the absence of ideology to justify subordination of the entire legal press to the party/state, more subtle and creative methods are used to ensure that the most important parts of the media system are subordinated to the party of power. One of the key trends in Russian media ownership since the 2000s has been a transformation of media ownership from commercial capital to state and mixed (state and private, non-media) capital.39 Ownership of key media organs has been secured by stripping sometime hostile owners of control through steps ranging from licensing, to fire, safety, and sanitary regulations, to customs and tax rules that target both publications and their 35 Oates, “Neo-Soviet Model,” p, 1286. 36 On sultanism, Linz and Stepan declare: “In sultanism, there is a high fusion by the ruler of the private and the public. The sultanistic polity becomes the personal domain of the sultan. In this domain there is no rule of law and there is low institutionalization... (There) is almost never political pluralism, because political power is so directly related to the ruler’s person.” Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press), p. 52. 37 As Peter Pomerantsev said in relation to Russian television, particularly RT, “Russia’s view on the world” turns out to be less about proposing one’s own ideology as the USSR did than undermining western narratives.” Pomerantsev. 2013. ‘The Kremlin’s attempt at soft power is back-to-front,’ Financial Times, December 6, 2013, p. 11. 38 Owen Mathews. 2010. “The Real Reasons Newsweek Russia Folded,’ October 20, 2010, At http://www.newsweek.com/real-reasons-newsweek-russia-folded-73747, accessed De-