Arbitration and Bargaining Across the Pacific
نویسندگان
چکیده
s This paper reports laboratory experiments comparing arbitration behavior between and across two developed countries with extensive trade relations, the United States and Japan. Besides comparing domestic disputes in both locations, we evaluate disputes between the two countries. While we find nominal differences between the US and Japan, we observe significant changes in both cultures when facing someone from the other culture. Specifically, Americans become more aggressive when facing a Japanese counterpart and Japanese subjects settle more frequently with an American counterpart. Our results suggest that previous research paints an incomplete picture of international comparisons by failing to consider cultural interactions. JEL Codes: C70, C90, D74, J52
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