The Evolution of Psychodynamic Mechanisms

If ... deceit is fundamental to animal communication, then there must be strong selection to spot deception and this ought, in tum, to select for a degree of self-deception. I ndecd, a great pan of psychoanalysis can be described as a theory of self-deception. As cognitive psychologists ask more about the origins and functions of mental mech­ anisms, they tum to evolutionary theory information-process ing mechanisms may give new significance to psychodynamics. Cognitive and evolutionary psychologists may find in psychodynamics careful descriptions of traits that may closely match the functional subunits of the mind that they are seelcing. Psychodynamic psychologists and psychiatrists may find in evolu­ tionary psychology new possibilities for a theoretical foundation in biology. This potential integration is viable only if some of the traits described by psycho­ analysts are legi t imate objects of evolutionary explanation. There are several reasons to believe that repression and other psychodynamic traits may be men til mechanisms shaped by natural selection: (a) They appear to be fairly uniform in humans (although more cross-<: u\tural study of this issue would be welcome); (b) their developmental patterns appear related to the tasks faced at each phase of life; (c) their complexity and careful regulation imply that they serve significant functions; (d) the behaviors they mediate, such as patterns of relationships, social communication, courtship behavior, inhibitions, guilt, and cognitive representations of the external world, are important to reproductive success; and (e) when they function abnormally, fitness often decreases. Although these factors justify an evolutionary analysis (Mayr, 1988, pp. 148-160), an evolutionary explanation of these traits requires demonstration of spe� cific functions and ways in which they enhance fitness. This.is oft en difficult, even for a physical trait. Nonetheless, this is what must be attempted, because confidence that a trait has been shaped by natural selection usually is based on a demonstration that its details match its function (Williams, 1966). Although several promising and interesting forays have bee n made (Badcock, Wenegrat, 1984), it remains uncertain whether a genuine integration of psychoanal­ ysis and evolutionary biology is essential or inevitable. We will, therefore, defend the more modest thesis that such an integration may be possible and valuable. We argue not that psychoanalytic concepts will turn out to exactly match the evolved functional subunits of the mind, but only that they of f er the best available starting point. Our method will be to examine a …