Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions∗
نویسنده
چکیده
While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.
منابع مشابه
2 00 9 Power indices and minimal winning coalitions Werner Kirsch and Jessica Langner
The Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in a voting system. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula to calculate both indices solely using the set of minimal winning c...
متن کامل2 00 9 Power indices and minimal winning coalitions Werner Kirsch and Jessica Langner June 21 , 2009
The Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in a voting system. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula to calculate both indices solely using the set of minimal winning c...
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The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula how to calculate both indices solely using the set of m...
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متن کامل2 00 9 Power indices and minimal winning coalitions
The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula how to calculate both indices solely using the set of m...
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