Randomness in Tax Enforcement
نویسندگان
چکیده
When there is tax evasion, increased randomness about how much taxable income an auditor would assess generally leads to higher reported income and more revenue. When reducing randomness is costly, optimality requires some randomness in assessed taxable income. Even if reducing randomness is costless, taxpayers may prefer some randomness when the increased revenue can be rebated, so that the government’s revenue stays fixed.
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