U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Partisanship: Support for the President and Solicitor General
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper analyzes the extent to which the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court cast votes that support the positions of the president, or more generally the Executive Branch. Can presidents count on such deference from those justices they nominate or those whom are nominated by other presidents of the same party? Or, do the justices demonstrate judicial independence and impartiality such that they are not so predisposed to vote in favor of arguments of their nominating president’s party? The results suggest that while in general the justices do not exhibit any marked tendency to partisan support of presidents, more recent and conservative Supreme Court justices are significantly more likely to support Republican presidents. Keywords—Separation of Powers, Solicitor General, U.S. President
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