A Peer-to-Peer Game Model using Punishment Strategies
نویسندگان
چکیده
Recent years, with the rapid development of P2P networks, the security problem of these networks has become increasingly obvious. According to the behavior of selfishness and betrayal for nodes in P2P networks, this paper analyzes and contrasts the benefits of these nodes, and presents the P2P game model with the penalty factor. The reasonable analysis and simulation by gambit prove that, addition of the penalty factor has certain constraints on the betray nodes and promotes the active cooperation of these nodes, thus improves the security status of P2P networks.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- JNW
دوره 5 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010