Clarity about concessive knowledge attributions: reply to Dodd

1 Clarity about Concessive Knowledge Attributions: Reply to Dodd Trent Dougherty Patrick Rysiew Recently, Dylan Dodd has tried to clear up what he takes to be some of the many confusions surrounding concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs) -i.e., utterances of the form “S knows that p, but it’s possible that q” (where q entails not-p) (Rysiew 2001). We agree with Dodd that there are a lot of mistaken beliefs amongst philosophers who’ve discussed CKAs. However, we fear that in his criticisms of Dougherty and Rysiew (2009), Dodd has created more clutter than clarity himself. In this brief note, we tidy up a bit with concise replies to the three points of criticism (and related matters) that Dodd raises.