Whatever happened to the soul? Some theological implications of neuroscience

What sets human beings apart from animals? How does ‘‘mind’’ fit with soul? Different historical and contemporary views of the mind/soul are considered. A clinical case is used to argue that a strong dualistic position is not compatible with neuro-scientific evidence nor with the expectation of life after death found in the Abrahamic faiths. Reductive physicalism is a widely held view, but risks devaluing human life. Midgely’s ‘‘many maps’’ model is suggested to fit better with a faith commitment. Non-reductive physicalism states that mind/soul is an emergent property of the complexity of the brain. Suggesting that there is no separable ‘‘soul’’ raises ethical questions, and Singer’s philosophy is given as one consequent reading of the moral standing of human beings. Holistic (weak) dualism and non-reductive physicalism are suggested as possible models of the nature of persons that fits both the scientific data and the teaching of the Abrahamic faiths. It is important for mental health professionals to be clear about their own and the service users’ underlying assumptions about human nature to optimise communication and prevent misdiagnosis.