Efficient End to End Verifiable Electronic Voting Employing Split Value Representations

We present a simple and fast method for conducting end to end voting and allowing public verification of correctness of the announced vote tallying results. In the present note voter privacy protection is achieved by use of a simple form of distributing the tallying of votes and creation of a verifiable proof of correctness amongst several servers, combined with random representations of integers as sums mod M of two values. At the end of vote tallying process, random permutations of the cast votes are publicly posted in the clear, without identification of voters or ballot ids. Thus vote counting and assurance of correct form of cast votes are directly available. Also, a proof of the claim that the revealed votes are a permutation of the concealed cast votes is publicly posted and verifiable by any interested party. We present two versions of the method, one assuring voter privacy and proof of correctness in the presence of information leaking devices, the other achieving the same goals as well as prevention of denial of service by failing or sabotaged devices. Advantages of this method are: Easy understandability by noncryptographers, implementers, and ease of use by voters and election officials. Direct handling of complicated ballot forms. Independence from any specialized cryptographic primitives. Verifiable mix nets without using public-key or homomorphic cryptography, a novel result of significance beyond e-voting. Speed of vote-tallying and correctness proving: elections involving a million voters can be tallied and proof of correctness of results posted within a few minutes.