Survival of the Fittest and Zero Sum Games
نویسنده
چکیده
Competition for available resources is natural amongst coexisting species, and the fittest contenders dominate over the rest in evolution. The dynamics of this selection is studied using a simple linear model. It has similarities to features of quantum computation, in particular conservation laws leading to destructive interference. Compared to an altruistic scenario, competition introduces instability and eliminates the weaker species in a finite time.
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