Evolutionary Epistemology and Sociology of Science

It is uncommon for philosophers to appeal to sociology in support of an epistemological theory, and it 1S even more uncommon for them to recognize and accept sociological findings when they are unsolicited. Recent sociology and anthropology of knowledge is a case in point: though some of us have on occasion found themselves embroiled in theoretical controversies with philosophers, we rarely succeeded in getting them to notice our empirical results (1). EE refers to a relatively recent attempt to extend the theory of b'iological evolution to scientific change. It is the first coherent epistemological program that 1S empirically grounded (2), and under the leadership of Don Campbell it has shown none of the predeterminations with which philosophers of SC1ence tend to fend off sociological inroads upon their territory. In fact, Campbell's challenge to sociology of SC1ence to come up with interesting answers to the many problems of scientific change is serious and sincere. But can we meet it? And does not our methodological orientation prevent us from cooperating with the only epistemology that till now has seriously espoused sociology of science? And that, for better or for worse, has felt "unanimously rejected" by the new sociology of science? I think we can do better than that, even though the benefit for either side may be less than clear. For example, my own methodological orientation has been more phenomenological ("constructivist") and microscopic than evolutionists are generally keen on, and little imagination is necessary for someone to envisage the quarrels which might arise between a constructivist and an evolutionary orientation. On the other hand, as Geertz says (1983: 19f.) there has been an enormous amount of genre m1x1ng 1n intellectual life in recent years, and one might go as far