Cache-timing attacks on AES
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper demonstrates complete AES key recovery from known-plaintext timings of a network server on another computer. This attack should be blamed on the AES design, not on the particular AES library used by the server; it is extremely difficult to write constant-time high-speed AES software for common general-purpose computers. This paper discusses several of the obstacles in detail.
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