Ex-post Stability in Large Games (draft, Comments Welcome)
نویسنده
چکیده
The equilibria of strategic games with many semi-anonymous players have a strong ex-post Nash property. Even with perfect hindsight about the realized types and selected actions of all his opponents, no player has an incentive to revise his own chosen action. This is illustrated for normal form and for one shot Baysian games with statistically independent types, provided that a certain continuity condition holds. Implications of this phenomenon include strong robustness properties of such equilibria and strong purification result for large anonymous games.
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