Corporate Savings, Financing, and Investment with Aggregate Uncertainty Shocks

This paper investigates how firms manage their savings, financing, and investment when aggregate uncertainty is time-varying. I develop and estimate a dynamic model featuring aggregate uncertainty shocks, costly external financing, investment irreversibility, and time-varying risk premia. In my model, firms have a precautionary-savings motive and real options to wait, both of which interact with time-varying uncertainty and are reinforced by state-dependent risk premia. My model confirms previous findings that firms save more in cash and invest less when aggregate uncertainty is high. In addition, I show that in the high uncertainty states, (1) firms with high profitability and low cash are more likely to delay equity issuance, (2) firms with low profitability and high cash are more likely to delay payout, and (3) aggregate equity issuance and payout are both lower. Finally, counterfactual experiments show that (1) a model without dynamic uncertainties cannot explain the observed firm behaviors in high uncertainty states, and (2) time-varying risk premia quantitatively amplify the impact of the aggregate uncertainty shocks. JEL Classification: C23, D92, E22, G32, G35.