Legalizing Bribe Giving

Norm, gender, and bribe-giving: Insights from a behavioral game

Previous research has suggested that bribery is more normative in some countries than in others. To understand the underlying process, this paper examines the effects of social norm and gender on bribe-giving behavior. We argue that social norms provide information for strategic planning and impression management, and thus would impact participants' bribe amount. Besides, males are more agentic...

The Endogenous Choice of Bribe Type under Asymmetric Punishment

As an instrument of corruption control, it has been argued that asymmetric punishment can eliminate harassment bribery if whistle-blowing is cheap and e ective. In a more realistic environment where bribery is most likely to survive and another type of bribery non harassment one coexists, this paper investigates how asymmetric punishment a ects the endogenous choice of bribe type to the bribe-g...

Can Regulations Reduce Corruption? Evidence from a Bribe-giving Firm‟s Records

This paper analyzes the internal bribery records made available for research by an Asian trading firm. It documents pervasive corruption in government procurement and evaluates the impact of different auction regulations. The average kickback was 14.7% of the product cost when auctions were not mandatory. To fight corruption, the government mandated best-value auctions in 2001, and strengthened...

Legalizing Marijuana in Canada — A Double-Edged Sword: A Response to Recent Commentaries

Bribery : Who Pays , Who Refuses , What Are The Payoffs ? ∗

We provide a theoretical framework for understanding when an official angles for a bribe, when a client pays, and the payoffs to the client’s decision. We test this framework using a new data set on bribery of Peruvian public officials by households. The theory predicts that bribery is more attractive to both parties when the client is richer, and we find empirically that both bribery incidence...