When Should Central Bankers Be Fired?

Stock Markets and Central Bankers : The Economic Consequences of Alan Greenspan

There is a near-consensus that central bankers should focus their attention on the control of inflation, and should accordingly not pay attention to movements in stock markets. This view is reinforced by the continuing influence of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), that maintains that financial markets correctly price firms at all times. We assert that this general view is incorrect. There...

“Rules Rather Than Discretion” After Twenty Five Years: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?

Kydland and Prescott first identified the inflationary bias that results when a central bank does not precommit to a monetary policy rule. Subsequent work, published over the past twenty five years, demonstrates that this inflationary bias can be minimized by appointing central bankers whose preferences or incentives differ systematically from those of society as a whole. Subsequent work also s...

Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?

Paper Autonomy, Private Ambition: Theory and Evidence Linking Central Bankers’ Careers and Economic Performance

Central bankers’ careers are shown to influence inflation outcomes. I present two theories in which careers explain central bank behavior, develop them in a game theoretic model, and test them using a comprehensive new data set of central bankers’ career backgrounds which spans twenty rich democracies and half a century. Career experiences vary considerably over this sample, and not only mould ...

Inflation forecast contracts

We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inflation forecast contracts, which make central bankers' remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more effectively, thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation. Inflation forecast contra...