Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives
نویسندگان
چکیده
For four alternatives and an even number of individuals, we prove a conjecture in a companion paper: It is impossible for a social choice rule to satisfy all of (1) Pareto, (2) anonymity, (3) full domain, and (4) independence of some alternative, a relaxation of Arrow’s IIA. JEL Codes: D70, D71
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 29 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007