A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems Gustavo Bergantiños and Juan J . Vidal - Puga 06 - 05
نویسنده
چکیده
We study minimum cost spanning tree problems and define a cost sharing rule that satisfies many more properties than other rules in the literature. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatic characterization based on monotonicity properties.
منابع مشابه
On Some Properties of Cost Allocation Rules in Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems
We consider four cost allocation rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems. These rules were introduced by Bird (1976), Dutta and Kar (2004), Kar (2002), and Feltkamp, Tijs and Muto (1994), respectively. We give a list of desirable properties and we study which properties are satisfied by these rules.
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We study minimum cost spanning tree problems and de ne a cost sharing rule that satis es many more properties than other rules in the literature. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatic characterization based on monotonicity properties. Keywords: Spanning tree. Cost allocation. Monotonicity. JEL Classi cation Numbers: C71, D63, D7.
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