A positive correlation between turnout and plurality does not refute the rational voter model

Many papers have tested the prediction of the rational voter model that, ceteris paribus, turnout will be low when potential voters expect the winner's plurality to be large. The appropriate null hypothesis, however, is unclear. We show that statistical models of voting in which each voter's decision of whether to vote does not vary with the expected plurality can nonetheless generate data which lead to both positive and negative correlations between turnout and plurality. The extensive empirical literature on the relation between turnout and political competition assumes that under the rational actor model of voting turnout is higher the smaller the expected plurality of the winning candidate (Downs, 1957; Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1975; Foster, 1984; Gray, 1976; Grofman, 1983; Patterson and Caldeira, 1983; Settle and Abrams, 1976; Tollison et al., 1975). This conclusion appears to follow from the assumption that a person's expected benefit from voting is