An Analysis of Firms’ Self-reported Anticorruption Efforts

نویسندگان

  • Paul Healy
  • George Serafeim
چکیده

We use Transparency International’s ratings of self-reported anticorruption efforts for 480 corporations to analyze factors underlying the ratings. Our tests examine whether these forms of disclosure reflect firms’ real efforts to combat corruption or are cheap talk. We find that firms with high ratings are domiciled in countries with low corruption ratings and strong anticorruption enforcement, operate in high corruption risk industries, have recently faced a corruption enforcement action, employ a Big Four audit firm, and have a higher percentage of independent directors. Controlling for these effects and other determinants, we find that firms with lower residual ratings have relatively higher subsequent media allegations of corruption. They also report higher future sales growth and show a negative relation between profitability change and sales growth in high corruption geographic segments. The net effect on valuation from sales growth and changes in profitability is close to zero. Given this evidence, we conclude that, on average, firms’ self-reported anticorruption efforts signal real efforts to combat corruption and are not merely cheap talk. * Paul Healy is a Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School, and George Serafeim is an Assistant Professor of Business Administration in Harvard Business School. We are grateful to Transparency International, in particular Robin Hodess and Deborah Hardoon, for providing the data for this study. We also wish to thank Barbara Esty, Kathleen Ryan and James Zeitler for research assistance with the media and governance data. Many thanks go to anticorruption experts at PwC and Siemens for helpful conversations around the importance of transparency in anticorruption efforts. Finally we are grateful for comments received by our editors SP Kothari and Rebecca Henderson, an anonymous referee, Robert Eccles, Eddie Riedl, Joe Weber (discussant), Gwen Yu, and participants at the HBS International Seminar, Boston University, Cornell University, NYU, and the HBS Corporate Accountability Reporting Conference. The project was supported by financial assistance from the Department of Faculty Research and Development of the Harvard Business School. Contact emails: Paul Healy [email protected], George Serafeim [email protected].

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Causes and Consequences of Firms' Self-Reported Anticorruption Efforts

We use Transparency International’s ratings of self-reported anticorruption efforts for 480 corporations to examine factors underlying firms’ efforts and their consequences. We find that firms with high anticorruption efforts are domiciled in countries with low corruption ratings and strong anticorruption enforcement, operate in high corruption risk industries, have recently faced a corruption ...

متن کامل

Causes and Consequences of Firm Disclosures of Anticorruption Efforts

Using Transparency International’s ratings of firm disclosures on anticorruption efforts, we find that disclosures are related to firms’ country and industry exposures to corruption, and to enforcement and monitoring variables. We then examine whether firms’ residual anticorruption disclosures are related to subsequent allegations of corruption and subsequent performance. Firms with abnormally ...

متن کامل

Dynamics of Industrial Buyer Behavior of Loader Backhoe

To investigate how the buying behavior of firms work is always needed, since it is an every changing process influenced by many forces in its surroundings. Industrial firms tend to have a smaller number of customers which means that they are easier to identify than customers in consumer markets. Effective marketing strategy relies on understanding consumers and their needs. This understanding m...

متن کامل

The Logic of Anticorruption Enforcement Campaigns in Contemporary China

Corruption is endemic and pervasive in contemporary China, yet serious attempts at anticorruption enforcement have been periodic in nature. What explains the timing of anticorruption campaigns? Available data, from 1981 to 1997, suggests a plausible correlation between changes in macroeconomic policy and the intensification of anticorruption enforcement. Four major anticorruption campaigns—in 1...

متن کامل

Corruption and competition in procurement auctions

We investigate the effect of corruption on competition in procurement. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e., the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide an opportunity for bid readjusments in exchange for a bribe. As firms expect to be paying a bribe, a mechanical effect of corruption is to increase the contract price by an amount corresponding to the anticipated brib...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2014