Working Papers Department of Economics University of Vienna
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper empirically explores the relationship between firms’ market behavior and their lobbying activities in a regulated market. In particular, we investigate whether the amount of contributions offered by cellular service providers to fund the campaigns of political parties affected market conduct in the early US mobile telecommunications industry. We structurally estimate market interactions while taking the potential endogeneity of lobbying decisions into account. Our results show that competition was more intense in those states where campaign contributions by the cellular industry have been higher. Furthermore, we reject the hypothesis that lobbying activities can be regarded as exogenous in the study of market conduct.
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WORKING PAPER 2008 - 08 REPA Resource Economics & Policy Analysis Research Group Department of Economics University of Victoria The Economics of Endangered Species Poaching
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. This working paper is made available by the Resource Economics and Policy Analysis (REPA) Research Group at the University of Victoria. REPA working papers have not been peer reviewed and contain preliminary research findings. They shall not...
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