A Theory of Heuristic and Systematic Information Processing

The heuristic-systematic model proposes two distinct modes of thinking about information. Systematic processing involves attempts to thoroughly understand any available information through careful attention, deep thinking, and intensive reasoning, whereas heuristic processing involves focusing on salient and easily comprehended cues that activate well-learned judgmental shortcuts. Heuristic processing is a more efficient and relatively automatic mode of processing, but more often than not confers less judgmental confidence. Systematic processing confers more confidence but is relatively effortful and timeconsuming. Thus, individuals tend to engage in heuristic processing unless they are both motivated and able to think carefully about information, in which case the two modes of processing can have additive, attenuating, or interactive effects. Furthermore, both modes of processing can be relatively open-minded, driven by accuracy concerns, or relatively biased, driven by defense or impression concerns. This chapter situates the heuristic-systematic model within its intellectual and personal history, and highlights key empirical findings that support the model’s central tenets. INTRODUCTION Attitudes have been a primary focus of theory and research in social psychology since the 1920s. Nine decades of research have produced a sizeable and complex body of literature that speak to questions of how people’s attitudes are formed, maintained, and changed, and provide an ever-growing foundation upon which new questions arise and new answers unfold. In 1980, a foundation of process-oriented models that explained attitude change based on how people understand and evaluate persuasive argumentation set the stage for one question in particular: Was careful argument scrutiny the only kind of process by which attitude change could occur? Or might we sometimes change our minds in more efficient, but less effortful, ways? The heuristic-systematic model of persuasion (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989, 1996; Chen and Chaiken, 1999) A THEORY OF HEURISTIC AND SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION PROCESSING 247 answers this question by proposing two distinct modes of information processing. The first mode, systematic processing, involves attempts to thoroughly understand any and all available information through careful attention, deep thinking, and intensive reasoning (e.g., thinking carefully about the arguments presented, the person arguing, and the causes of the person’s behavior). This information is combined and used to guide subsequent attitudes, judgments, and behaviors. For instance, a systematic approach to thinking about a proposed economic policy might involve reading as many magazine and newspaper reports as possible to learn and develop an opinion about the “best” course of action for the economy. The heuristicsystematic model suggests that such systematic thinking entails a relatively high degree of mental effort, and thus requires that a person (1) can devote a certain amount of attention to thinking about the issue, and (2) wants to devote this attention. Thus, systematic processing is unlikely to occur unless a person is both able and motivated to do so. Heuristic processing is much less demanding in terms of the mental work required and much less dependent on having the ability (e.g., enough knowledge and enough time) to think carefully about information. In fact, heuristic processing can be viewed as relatively automatic because it can occur even when people are not motivated and able to deliberately think about a topic. Heuristic processing involves focusing on easily noticed and easily understood cues, such as a communicator’s credentials (e.g., expert versus nonexpert), the group membership of the communicator (e.g., Democrat or Republican), the number of arguments presented (many or few), or audience reactions (positive or negative). These cues are linked to well-learned, everyday decision rules known as heuristics. Like other knowledge structures (e.g., stereotypes), heuristics can vary in their availability and accessibility, as well as in their perceived reliability (i.e., the extent to which a particular person perceives a heuristic to be a valid guide for judgment in a given situation; see Chen and Chaiken, 1999; Darke et al., 1998). Moreover, they can be used self-consciously or non-selfconsciously: People may consciously decide to invoke a heuristic in order to inform a subsequent judgment, but heuristics can also influence judgments without intention or self-awareness. Examples of heuristics include “experts know best,” “my own group can be trusted,” “argument length equals argument strength,” and “consensus implies correctness.” These simple, intuitive rules allow people to form judgments, attitudes, and intentions quickly and efficiently, simply on the basis of the easily noticed cues, and with little critical thinking. A heuristic approach to a proposed economic plan might involve simply adopting the opinion of a noted economist. In other words, heuristic thinking is what we do when we do not have much ability or time to think about something and want to make a reasonable decision as quickly as possible. The theory further proposed that two principles act in conjunction to determine the mode and extent of information processing that occurs in any given context (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989). The model’s least effort principle reflects the assumption that individuals try to arrive at attitudinal decisions as efficiently as possible (see also Allport, 1954). Thus, all else equal, people should tend to prefer a less effortful mode of processing (i.e., heuristic processing) to one that requires more time and cognitive resources (i.e., systematic processing). Meanwhile, however, the sufficiency principle asserts that individuals are sometimes motivated to exert additional cognitive effort in order to reach a certain level of judgmental confidence. They must therefore balance their preference for maximizing cognitive efficiency with the desire to satisfy their motivational concerns, such as the goal to reach an accurate conclusion (Chaiken et al., 1989; see also Simon, 1976). The heuristic-systematic model suggests that this balance point is determined by a sufficiency HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 248 threshold, defined as the degree of confidence to which an individual aspires in a given judgmental situation (Chaiken et al., 1989; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). The sufficiency threshold can be conceptualized as a point located on a continuum of judgmental confidence. The extent of information processing is determined by the size of the discrepancy that exists between an individual’s actual level of confidence in their judgment and the sufficiency threshold (i.e., their desired confidence). Thus, effortful information processing should only occur when actual confidence falls below the sufficiency threshold, and should continue (when capacity allows) until this confidence gap is closed. Extent of information processing will therefore depend both on a particular person’s actual level of judgmental confidence in a given persuasion setting, as well as their desired level of confidence in that setting (see Figure 12.1). Together, the least effort and sufficiency principles suggest that – assuming adequate cognitive capacity – individuals will engage in systematic processing insofar as the less Figure 12.1 A person with a small gap between actual and desired confidence might be able to reach their desired level of confidence (the sufficiency threshold) using only heuristic processing (Panel A). If the confidence gap is larger, either due to a low level of actual confidence (Panel B) or a high level of desired confidence (Panel C), it is less likely that people can reach their desired level of judgmental confidence using only heuristic processing. When people cannot attain their desired level of confidence using only heuristic processing, they will engage in systematic processing in an effort to finish closing the confidence gap, assuming they have the ability to do so A.