Do Sunspots Matter? Evidence from an Experimental Study of Bank Runs∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We investigate reactions to sunspots in a bank-run game in a controlled laboratory environment. The sunspot variable is a series of random public announcements predicting withdrawal outcomes. The treatment variable is the coordination parameter, defined as the minimum fraction of depositors required to wait so that waiting entails a higher payoff than withdrawing. We conduct treatments with high, low and intermediate values of the coordination parameter, respectively. Strong responses to sunspots occur only in the treatment featuring the intermediate value, where strategic uncertainty is high. The policy implication is public statements must be treated with extra care during uncertain times. JEL Categories: C92; E58; G20
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