The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider the generalization of Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) [Shapley, L., Scarf’s, H., 1974. On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 23–37.] model of trading indivisible objects (houses) to so-called multiple-type housing markets. We show that the prominent solution for these markets, the coordinate-wise core rule, is second-best incentive compatible. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL Classification: D63; D70
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