Overlapping Generations, Moral Hazard, and the Organization of Medical Partnerships
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Market Organization and the Prices of Financial Assets*
Several empirical regularities in the prices of financial assets are at odds with the predictions of standard economic theory. I address these regularities and explore the extent to which they are resolved in the context of two markets organized in very different ways. The first setting is a neoclassical economy with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents. Market incompleteness naturally a...
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