Satisficing and Learning Cooperation in the Prisoner s Dilemma
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Learning Dynamics in Economic Games
When playing games human decision behaviour is often found to be diverse. For instance, in repeated prisoner dilemma games humans exhibit broad distributions of cooperativity and on average do not optimize their mean payoff. Deviations from optimal behaviour have been attributed to auxiliary causes including randomness of decisions, mis-estimations of probabilities, accessory objectives, or emo...
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