The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration
نویسنده
چکیده
It is known that the value of a zero-sum infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on both sides need not exist [1]. It is proved that any number between the minmax and the maxmin of the zero-sum infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on both sides is the value of the long finitely repeated game where players’ information about the uncertain number of repetitions is asymmetric.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 41 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012