An Optimal Signaling Equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper analyses the optimal combination of costly and costless messages that a Sender uses in a signaling game if he is able to choose among all equilibrium communication strategies. We provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium that maximizes the Sender’s ex ante expected utility in case of uniformly distributed types and quadratic loss functions. First, the Sender often wants to avoid money burning by using the most informative cheap talk communication strategy. Second, if he does burn money, he avoids separation and only re-arranges the existing intervals of the most informative cheap talk equilibrium, possibly adding one extra interval. Money burning takes place in the second interval only.
منابع مشابه
Investigating the risk-taking behavior of the banking industry in the form of the general equilibrium model of overlapping generations (OLG)
In this paper, using a general equilibrium model of overlapping generations, the impact of different financing plans of the banking industry on their risk-taking motivation is investigated. In the non-competitive banking industry, financing is done by imposing taxes on the older generation or the bankchr('39')s internal resources (bank shares). As an effective policy, this action optimizes soci...
متن کاملDesign of Optimal Process Flowsheet for Fractional Crystallization Separation Process
A procedure is presented that synthesizes fractional crystallization separation processes to obtain pure solids from multi-component solutions. The method includes a procedure to generate a network flow model to identify alternative process designs for fractional crystallization. The main advantage of this systematic procedure with respect to other reported procedures is using non-equilibri...
متن کاملModeling, Survey the Nash Equilibrium and Optimal Tax Fine Rate Determine in the Game of Taxpayers and Tax Affairs Organization
Todays, the importance of taxes as the main source of government revenue has been approved by economic policymakers and therefore, designing an optimal tax system to achieve this subject is essential. Governments are looking for ways to receive their target taxes from taxpayers at the lowest possible cost and at the declaration tax. Taxpayers, on the other hand, seek to postponed their taxes as...
متن کاملAn Analysis the Effect of Capital Taxation on Allocation of Resources: A Dynamic Equilibrium Model Approach
Abstract T he return of capital is fundamental to the intertemporal allocation of resources by changing the consumption behavior and capital accumulation over time. Taxation on return of capital increases the marginal product of capital, meaning that capital stock is lower than when capital is not taxed, which results decreased growth and welfare in steady state. This pape...
متن کاملThe evolution of begging: signaling and sibling competition.
In many species, young solicit food from their parents, which respond by feeding them. Because of the difference in genetic make-up between parents and their offspring and the consequent conflict, this interaction is often studied as a paradigm for the evolution of communication. Existent theoretical models demonstrate that chick signaling and parent responding can be stable if solicitation is ...
متن کامل