Merging Prêt-à-Voter and PunchScan
نویسنده
چکیده
We describe a variation of the Prêt-à-Voter voting protocol that keeps the same ballot layout but borrows and slightly modifies the underlying cryptographic primitives from Punchscan, which is based on bit commitments. By using unconditionally hiding bit commitments, our protocol obtains unconditional privacy. We suggest a way to make cheating on the computational binding bit commitments impossible under assumptions that seem plausible for large-scale elections. Also we show ways to have several races on the Prêt-à-Voter ballot, showing that with respect to ballot layout the protocols are almost identical.
منابع مشابه
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