SBBA: A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism
نویسندگان
چکیده
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented the first dominant strategy truthful mechanism for double auction. His mechanism attains nearly optimal gain-from-trade when the market is sufficiently large. However, his mechanism may leave money on the table, since the price paid by the buyers may be higher than the price paid to the sellers. This money is included in the gain-from-trade and in some cases it accounts for almost all the gain-from-trade, leaving almost no gain-fromtrade to the traders. We present SBBA: a variant of McAfee’s mechanism which is strongly budget-balanced. There is a single price, all money is exchanged between buyers and sellers and no money is left on the table. This means that all gain-from-trade is enjoyed by the traders. We generalize this variant to spatially-distributed markets with transit costs.
منابع مشابه
A Comparative Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms
Auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. Single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. Double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. Nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auctio...
متن کاملMulti-unit Double Auction under Group Buying
Group buying is a business model in which a number of buyers join together to make an order of a product in a certain quantity in order to gain a desirable discounted price. Such a business model has recently received significant attention from researchers in economics and computer science, mostly due to its successful application in online businesses, such as Groupon5. This paper deals with th...
متن کاملA distributed auction-based algorithm to allocate bandwidth over paths
In the literature, Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) double-sided auctions have been applied to inter-domain traffic exchange because they provide incentives to be truthful and lead to an efficient use of the network, among relevant properties of mechanism design. Unfortunately, the resulting resource allocation scheme is neither budget-balanced nor solvable in a decentralized way, two important prope...
متن کاملMIDA: A Multi Item-type Double-Auction Mechanism
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auction, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee’s mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single item and each buyer to buy a single item. In this paper, we present a double-auction mechanism that handles ...
متن کاملSequential partition mechanism for strongly budget-balanced redistribution
We propose a new class of strategy-proof and strongly budgetbalanced redistribution mechanisms called the sequential partition mechanism (SPM). Recently, studies on redistribution mechanisms have attracted increased attention in the research area of mechanism design to achieve a desirable social decision among self-interested agents. However, since no redistribution mechanism can simultaneously...
متن کامل