Prior Free Optimal Mechanism Design
نویسنده
چکیده
My research interest primarily lies in theoretical computer science and more specifically in approximation algorithms and game theory. In the first half of my Ph.D. the focus of my research was mostly on approximation algorithms. After spending a summer at Yahoo! as an intern, I became interested in the sponsored search problems and as a result the new field of algorithmic game theory which is the intersection of algorithms and game theory. During the past two years, I studied various problems related to sponsored search and electronic commerce from both combinatorial aspects as well the game theoretic aspects. Next, I provide a short summary of the problems that I would like to work on in future and a very short summary of the work that I have done during my Ph.D.
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