What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper studies the falsifiability of two-sided matching theory when agents’ preferences are unknown. A collection of matchings is rationalizable if there are preferences for the agents involved so that the matchings are stable. We show that there are nonrationalizable collections of matchings; hence, the theory is falsifiable. We also characterize the rationalizable collections of matchings, which leads to a test of matching theory in the spirit of revealed-preference tests of individual optimizing behavior.
منابع مشابه
Aggregate Matchings ∗ Federico Echenique
This paper characterizes the testable implications of stability for aggregate matchings. We consider data on matchings where individuals are aggregated, based on their observable characteristics, into types, and we know how many agents of each type match. We derive stability conditions for an aggregate matching, and, based on these, provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition for an obs...
متن کاملOn the Stable Matchings That Can Be Reached When the Agents Go Marching in One By One
The Random Order Mechanism (ROM) can be thought of as a sequential version of Gale and Shapley’s deferred-acceptance (DA) algorithm where agents are arriving one at a time, and each newly arrived agent has an opportunity to propose. Like the DA algorithm, ROM can be implemented in polynomial time. Unlike the DA algorithm, it is possible for ROM to output a stable matching that is different from...
متن کاملSocial Networks and Stable Matchings in the Job Market
For most people, social contacts play an integral part in finding a new job. As observed by Granovetter’s seminal study, the proportion of jobs obtained through social contacts is usually large compared to those obtained through postings or agencies. At the same time, job markets are a natural example of two-sided matching markets. An important solution concept in such markets is that of stable...
متن کاملStable marriages and search frictions
Stable matchings are the primary solution concept for two-sided matching markets with nontransferable utility. We investigate the strategic foundations of stability in a decentralized matching market. Towards this end, we embed the standard marriage markets in a search model with random meetings. We study the limit of steady-state equilibria as exogenous frictions vanish. The main result is tha...
متن کاملThe Generalized Median Stable Matchings: Finding Them Is Not That Easy
Let I be a stable matching instance with N stable matchings. For each man m, order his N stable partners from his most preferred to his least preferred. Denote the ith woman in his sorted list as pi(m). Let αi consist of the man-woman pairs where each man m is matched to pi(m). Teo and Sethuraman proved this surprising result: for i = 1 to N , not only is αi a matching, it is also stable. The α...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Math. Oper. Res.
دوره 33 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008