Stable Observable Behavior
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study stable behavior when players are randomly matched to play a game, and before the game begins each player may observe how his partner behaved in a few interactions in the past. We present a novel modeling approach and we show that strict Nash equilibria are always stable in such environments. We apply the model to study the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We show that if players only observe past actions, then defection is the unique stable outcome. However, if players are able to observe past action profiles, then cooperation is also stable. Finally, we present extensions that study endogenous observation probabilities and the evolution of preferences. JEL Classification: C72, C73, D01, D83.
منابع مشابه
Search for A Lyapunov Function through Empirical Approximation by Artificial Neural Nets: Theoretical Framework
An artificial neural network is proposed as a function approximator for empirical modeling of a Lyapunov function for a nonlinear dynamic system that projects stable behavior as potentially observable in its state space. Theoretical framework for the methodology of designing the so-called Lyapunov neural network, which empirically models a Lyapunov function, is described. Algorithms for trainin...
متن کاملA Control Theoretical Model for Quality of Service Adaptations
In a distributed environment where multiple applications compete and share a limited amount of system resources, applications tend to suffer from variations in resource availability, and are desired to adapt their behavior to the resource variations of the system. We propose a Task Control Model to rigorously model the dynamics of an adaptive system, using the digital control theory. With our T...
متن کاملDetection of Changes by Observer in Timed Event Graphs and Time Stream Event Graphs
A state-based approach for detection of changes in systems modelled as Timed Event Graph and Time Stream Event Graph is presented. We assume that the net in its nominal behavior is known and transitions are partitioned as observable and unobservable transitions. Considered faults are (possibly small) variations of dynamical models by respect to this nominal behavior. Using the algebra of dioids...
متن کاملSTUDYING THE BEHAVIOR OF SOLUTIONS OF A SECOND-ORDER RATIONAL DIFFERENCE EQUATION AND A RATIONAL SYSTEM
In this paper we investigate the behavior of solutions, stable and unstable of the solutions a second-order rational difference equation. Also we will discuss about the behavior of solutions a the rational system, we show these solutions may be stable or unstable.
متن کاملProduct operation and joint interval valued observable
The aim of this paper is to define the productoperation on a family of interval valued events and the notion ofjoint interval valued observable. We show the connection betweenproduct operations for interval valued events and intuitionisticfuzzy events, too. We display the relation between joint intervalvalued observable and joint intuitionistic fuzzy observable. We...
متن کامل