Average-Case Analyses of Vickrey Costs

نویسندگان

  • Prasad Chebolu
  • Alan M. Frieze
  • Páll Melsted
  • Gregory B. Sorkin
چکیده

We explore the average-case “Vickrey” cost of structures in a random setting: the Vickrey cost of a shortest path in a complete graph or digraph with random edge weights; the Vickrey cost of a minimum spanning tree (MST) in a complete graph with random edge weights; and the Vickrey cost of a perfect matching in a complete bipartite graph with random edge weights. In each case, in the large-size limit, the Vickrey cost is precisely 2 times the (non-Vickrey) minimum cost, but this is the result of case-specific calculations, with no general reason found for it to be true. Separately, we consider the problem of sparsifying a complete graph with random edge weights so that all-pairs shortest paths are preserved approximately. The problem of sparsifying a given graph so that for every pair of vertices, the length of the shortest path in the sparsified graph is within some multiplicative factor and/or additive constant of the original distance has received substantial study in theoretical computer science. For the complete graph Kn with additive edge weights, we show that whp Θ(n lnn) edges are necessary and sufficient for a spanning subgraph to give good all-pairs shortest paths approximations.

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تاریخ انتشار 2009