An RFID Unilateral Distance Bounding Protocol and Analysis Over a Noisy Channel

Abstract form of automatic identification systems used for humans and objects is radio frequency identification (RFID). Fast and almost error-free calculations have led to its wide application in many places. Distance Bounding (DB) protocols verify that the tag is within a certain distance form reader. This process can be done by measuring the round trip time for message exchange. These protocols are sensitive to location-based attacks and noisy environment. Currently, many unilateral DB protocols have been designed to resist location-based attacks. As a general classification, existing DB protocols are divided into two categories: those based on the Brand and Chaum (BC) protocol and those based on the Hancke and Kuhn (HK) protocol. In this paper, we present a unilateral HK-based DB protocol. Using this protocol, two random binary challenges are sent and responses receive with a predefined delay. The communication channel between tag and reader is noisy. The DB protocols are very sensitive to noisy environment while the communication should be resilient to noise. The security of this protocol analyzed in binary symmetric channel (BSC). The results show reduced adversary success probability due to mafia and distance fraud in both noiseless and noisy channels among existing DB protocols.