Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups
نویسندگان
چکیده
Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held weekly meetings. We find no increase in default and larger groups after three years in pre-existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas.
منابع مشابه
Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups
☆ We are grateful to the World Bank Research Com Foundation CAREER SES-0547898, and the Bill and Meli the Financial Access Initiative for funding this research. W Ghatak, and the referees, for their helpful comments. W Warwick, Karla Hoff, Kate Johnson, Jonathan Morduch BruceWydick, Dean Yang, and seminar and several confer ments on this project. We thank John Owens and the USA Access to Bankin...
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