Fairness in Combinatorial Auctioning Systems
نویسندگان
چکیده
One of the Multi-Agent Systems that is widely used by various government agencies, buyers and sellers in a market economy, in such a manner so as to attain optimized resource allocation, is the Combinatorial Auctioning System (CAS). We study another important aspect of resource allocations in CAS, namely fairness. We present two important notions of fairness in CAS, extended fairness and basic fairness. We give an algorithm that works by incorporating a metric to ensure fairness in a CAS that uses the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism, and uses an algorithm of Sandholm to achieve optimality. Mathematical formulations are given to represent measures of extended fairness and basic fairness.
منابع مشابه
Fairness in Combinatorial Auctions
The market economy deals with many interacting agents such as buyers and sellers who are autonomous intelligent agents pursuing their own interests. One such multi-agent system (MAS) that plays an important role in auctions is the combinatorial auctioning system (CAS). We use this framework to define our concept of fairness in terms of what we call as “basic fairness” and “extended fairness.” T...
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