Exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted borda manipulation problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
Both weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems have been proved NP-hard. However, there is no exact combinatorial algorithm known for these problems. In this paper, we initiate the study of exact combinatorial algorithms for both weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems. More precisely, we propose O∗((m · 2)) time andO∗(t2m) time combinatorial algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems, respectively, where t is the number of manipulators and m is the number of candidates. Thus, for t = 2 we solve one of the open problems posted by Betzler et al. [IJCAI 2011]. As a byproduct of our results, we show that the unweighted Borda manipulation problem admits an algorithm of running time O∗(29m 2 ), based on an integer linear programming technique. Finally, we study the unweighted Borda manipulation problem under single-peaked elections and present polynomial-time algorithms for the problem in the case of two manipulators, in contrast to the NP-hardness of this case in general settings.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Theor. Comput. Sci.
دوره 622 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013