EPGE Economic Essays INTERIM EFFICIENCY WITH MEU-PREFERENCES
نویسندگان
چکیده
Recently Kajii and Ui (2008) proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors. When agents have Bewley’s incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui (2008) proposed a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of posteriors. However, when agents have Gilboa–Schmeidler’s MaxMin expected utility preferences, Kajii and Ui (2008) only propose a sufficient condition. The objective of this note is to complete Kajii and Ui’s work by proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for interim efficiency even if agents have MaxMin expected utility preferences. Our proof is based on a direct application of some results proposed by Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008). We derive all the results in Kajii and Ui (2008) has simple corollaries of our general characterization.
منابع مشابه
Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences
Recently Kajii and Ui [17] proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple posteriors. When agents have Bewley’s incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui [17] proposed a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of posteriors. However, when agents have Gilboa–Schmeidler’s MaxMin expected utili...
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