Generalized prisoner's dilemma

نویسندگان

  • Xinyang Deng
  • Qi Liu
  • Yong Deng
چکیده

Prisoner’s dilemma has been heavily studied. In classical model, each player chooses to either ”Cooperate” or ”Defect”. In this paper, we generalize the prisoner’s dilemma with a new alternative which is neither defect or cooperation. The classical model is the special case under the condition that the third state is not taken into consideration.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • CoRR

دوره abs/1403.3595  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2014